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HAS THE ACCURACY OF GERMAN MACROECONOMIC FORECASTS IMPROVED? 
by Ullrich Heilemann1 and H.O. Stekler2 
Abstract 
The major focus of this paper is to determine whether the accuracy of German 
macroeconomic forecasts has improved over time. We examine 1-year-ahead forecasts 
of real GDP and inflation for 1967 to 2001 made by three major German forecasting 
groups and the OECD. We examine the accuracy of the forecasts over the entire period 
and in three sub-periods. We conclude that, with some exceptions, the errors of the 
German forecasters were similar to those of their US and UK counterparts. While the 
absolute size of the forecast errors has declined, this is not the case for relative accuracy. 
A benchmark comparison of these predictions with the ex post forecasts of a 
macroeconometric model indicates that the quality of the growth forecasts can be 
improved but that the expected increase in accuracy may not be substantial.  
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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper, Fildes and Stekler (2002) presented a survey of our current knowledge 
about the state of macroeconomic forecasting. While they mentioned some of the 
findings related to the forecasts of other countries, their survey primarily focused on the 
forecasts produced in the US and the UK. This paper presents an in depth examination 
of German macroeconomic forecasts to determine (1) whether the characteristics of 
these forecasts are similar to those of the US and UK and (2) whether the forecasts have 
improved over time. We also use an econometric model as a benchmark to determine 
the maximum increase in forecast accuracy that can be expected. 
Quantitative forecasting in Germany began in earnest in the mid-1960s when the Joint 
Diagnosis3 (JD) of the five (now six) large economic research institutes started to be 
published. This was followed by the forecasts of the newly established Council of 
Economic Experts (CEE) and the Annual Economic Report of the Federal Government 
(GAER). In the 1970s an increasing number of private forecasters, most of them from 
the banking sector, also started to issue macroeconomic forecasts. If the IMF, the 
OECD, the World Bank and the EU-Commission are included, there are now more than 
30 institutions that regularly publish macroeconomic forecasts for Germany. 
There have been a number of analyses of the accuracy of German macroeconomic 
forecasts (see e.g., Blix et al., 2001; Döpke, 2000; Öller & Barot, 2000; Pons, 2000; 
Kreinin, 2000). These studies report the usual statistics on absolute and relative 
accuracy or other forecast characteristics over a specific time span. Depending on the 
forecasters and the time period, the mean absolute errors (MAE) of the forecasts of the 
growth vary between 1.2 and 1.6 percentage points. The errors of the inflation forecasts 
vary between 0.6 and 0.8 percentage points. Many studies try to ascertain a ranking with 
respect to forecasters, methods, and variables. Most concluded that there is no forecaster 
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(or method) that is by all standards and for all variables always the best. This finding is 
similar to the results for the U.S. (e.g., Zarnowitz, 1992). 
None of these studies has undertaken an explicit analysis of the way accuracy has 
changed over the past four decades. For shorter periods, deviations from what appears to 
be the standard are occasionally reported, but systematic studies over longer periods are 
missing. Implicit references can occasionally be found (e.g. Döpke and Langfeldt, 1995; 
Döpke, 2000; Heilemann, 1998).4 Most studies that partition the sample period 
primarily examine the stability of the rankings of either the forecasters or the methods 
rather than analyze the time trend of forecast accuracy itself. 
Although there has been no systematic analysis that has determined whether the 
accuracy of German forecasts has improved over time, this issue has been previously 
discussed in different contexts. In the 1950s and 1960s, with the development of large-
scale econometric models, macroeconomists expected that the accuracy of their 
forecasts would improve over time. Since then things have changed. None of the 
contributions to the Centenary issue of the Economic Journal (1991) expected major 
improvements in the accuracy of forecasts. On the other hand, Diebold (1998) expressed 
a more optimistic view while Hendry (2001) doubted that this would occur. The major 
empirical studies, analyzing US forecasts, were undertaken by McNees (1986) and 
Zarnowitz (1992) , but they reached conflicting conclusions about the improvement in 
accuracy over time. 
It is, therefore, appropriate to revisit the question of whether forecasts have improved 
over time, but this time with data that have not previously been used. This paper will 
examine four sets of German forecasts for the period, 1967-2001, primarily focusing on 
whether the accuracy of the forecasts changed over time. While this will be the primary 
focus, there will also be a discussion of forecast accuracy for the entire period and of the 
limits to the improvement in accuracy that can be expected. The next sections will 
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discuss our sample of forecasters, the time periods that will be examined and the 
methods of analysis. We then present and explain the results. We also use an 
econometric model as a benchmark in order to determine whether there are limits to the 
accuracy that can be expected from macroeconomic forecasts. 
2. Forecasters, samples, data, methods of analysis 
2.1. Major macroeconomic forecasters 
While a dozen major institutions produce macroeconomic forecasts for Germany, only 
four sets of forecasts are examined here. A number of criteria were used in selecting the 
organizations whose forecasts are analyzed. First, the organizations should play an 
important role in the public discussions of economic policies. The organizations should 
have produced a sufficient number of forecasts that would be available to determine 
whether accuracy has improved over time. Furthermore, the sample was selected to 
include forecasts from non-government as well as from government institutions and 
from one international organization. Finally, the forecasts had to be comparable as to the 
variables forecast, the forecast horizon, and the date of their publication. This led to the 
selection of the forecasts produced by (1) the Joint Diagnosis (JD)5, (2) the Council of 
Economic Experts (CEE), (3) the Government Annual Economic Report (GAER), and 
(4) the OECD. 
2.2. Data 
Forecast accuracy and its evolution over time are analyzed here from the perspective of 
economic policy, or more specifically from fiscal policy. That is why we examine 
forecasts that are made infrequently and have a horizon of 6-18 months.6 The study 
concentrates on two variables, the rates of change of real GDP and of the GDP deflator. 
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“Growth” and “no inflation” are considered two of the most important macroeconomic 
goals. Given the strong dependencies of employment, the government deficit, etc., upon 
these two variables, they are also good indicators of the accuracy that might be expected 
if one evaluated the accuracy of the forecasts of these other variables.  
In order to have a common base, the analysis begins in 1967, when the GAER published 
its first forecast. The sample ends with the year 2001. To examine the evolution of 
forecast accuracy, the sample is divided into three sub periods 1970-1979, 1980-1989 
and 1990-2001.7 While these sub periods are frequently used in analyses, their selection 
is still arbitrary.8 Since each sub period is at least 10 years long, any cyclical bias should 
have been eliminated. Indeed, each decade experienced a recession. Other “events” 
affecting forecast accuracy such as the oil-shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, German 
unification, the Maastricht treaty and its fiscal consequences, and the Asia/Russia crisis 
1997/8 are also included.  
The forecasts are for the latter part of the current year and for the following year, but we 
only analyze the year-ahead predictions. The forecasts are published over a stretch of 
four months: {October (JD), November (CEE), December (OECD), and January 
(GAER)}, but the actual data on which they are based are not too different. The JD, 
CEE and also the OECD forecasts, given its three months of preparation, have to start 
from National Accounts (NA) data ending with the second quarter; the GAER, however, 
can start from data for the third quarter and can probably also use the Federal Statistical 
Office’s first estimate of GDP for the past year, which is issued in mid January of the 
following year. In the period studied here, there were only a few cases in which 
macroeconomic developments and events of essential importance happened between 
October and January. Although the GAER forecasts uses more information, notably 
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later data, and thus should be more accurate, it has been shown that this is hardly the 
case (Heilemann, 1998).  
Many of the German forecasts have been presented with rates of change rounded to ½ 
percentage points. Consequently, in order for the forecasts and actual data to be 
comparable, all the forecasts and the actual data were rounded. (A preliminary analysis 
showed that in those cases where the original forecasts had not been rounded, the 
differences in the results were small.) In 1993 the German Federal Statistics Office 
changed its NA concepts and, as its measure of output, replaced GNP by GDP. Hence, 
until 1993 “growth” is associated with real GNP, thereafter with real GDP; the inflation 
indicator was changed correspondingly. The actual data were taken from the Federal 
Statistical Office’s first release of NA data for the previous year. The data and sources 
are given in detail in Table 5 (Appendix). 
2.4. Measures of forecast accuracy 
Our measures of forecast accuracy include descriptive statistics, tests for directional 
accuracy and rationality tests.  
2.4.1. Quantitative Measures 
There are many statistics that may be used to measure forecast accuracy (Stekler, 1991; 
Diebold and Mariano, 1995; Döpke, 2000). Here, we focus on the bias, the mean 
absolute error (MAE), and the root-mean-square percentage error (RMSPE). As a 
benchmark, comparative accuracy is measured by Theil’s U coefficient (based on 
extrapolating the previous rate of change pt = at-1) and its decomposition is used to 
inform about the nature of forecast errors. Given that Germany has experienced a 
general decline in the rates of change of both growth and of inflation, the test is biased 
against an extrapolation of the previous year’s rates of change. The forecast 
performance associated with the difficulty of the task is measured by the relationship of 
RMSE/σ (Ash, Smyth, and Heravi, 1993).  
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In determining whether forecast accuracy has changed over time, we adopt a method 
that is widely used in analyzing quality control and the stability of regression 
coefficients but that has not been extensively applied in evaluating forecast accuracy. 
The method consists of a CUSUM test.  
2.4.2. Directional Accuracy 
In analyzing directional accuracy we first describe the type of errors that were observed, 
namely the failure to predict turning points and the number of over and underestimates 
that occurred. Then we determine whether the accelerations and decelerations in the 
growth and inflation rates were correctly predicted. We use the concept of 
“Informational content” (IC) which compares the number of accelerations 
(decelerations) of changes that are forecast and realized (see e.g., Diebold & Lopez, 
1996): 
DWDC
DC
AWAC
ACIC
+
+
+
=  
with AC: increase forecast and realized; AW: increase forecast, decrease realized; DC: 
decrease forecast, and realized; and DW: decrease forecast, increased realized. 
Following Merton (1981), we assume that for a forecast to have “informational 
content”, IC has to be > 1. Under the null hypothesis that forecasts and realizations are 
independent and using past realizations, the probabilities for the four cases (cells) can be 
consistently estimated. They can be compared with the actual number and tested against 
a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom: 
( ) 21ij
22
1j,i
ijij EˆEˆOC χ→−= 
=
 
with: ijO : observed cell counts and ijEˆ : estimated cell counts. 
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2.4.3. Rationality 
The rationality of forecasts, based on unbiasedness and efficiency, is tested in the 
“traditional way” (Kirchgässner, 1993). A sufficient condition that the forecasts are 
unbiased is that the joint null, α1 = 0 and β1 = 1, in regression (1) cannot be rejected. 
  tt11t up
 
a +⋅+=  (1) 
The forecasts are efficient if β2 = 0 in (2) 
  tt22t up
 
e +⋅+= , (2) 
and ρ = 0 in (3). 
  t1t3t ue
e +⋅+=
−
. (3) 
The test here is based – like Theil’s inequality coefficient – on the assumption that the 
previous year’s actual data are known. 
3. Results: The complete sample – a summary  
The main focus of our analysis is on the question of whether the German forecasts have 
improved over time. Nevertheless, we summarize the results for the entire period , 1967-
2001. The forecasts and the actual data of growth and inflation are shown in Figure 1, 
and the results of the accuracy analysis are in Table 1. The MAE of the growth forecasts 
is about 1.2 percentage points. This was about 40% of the mean absolute change. 
Similarly, the MAE of the inflation forecasts was about 0.7 percentage points, but this 
was only 20% of the mean absolute change in the inflation rates.9 The RMSPE is about  
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Figure 1 
Accuracy of forecasts of real GDP and of GDP price deflator for Germany
1967 to 2001
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Sources: Federal Statistical Office, JD, CEE, OECD, GAER and own Computations. – 
For details see text.
 
125 % and about 85 % for the growth and inflation forecasts, respectively.10 The 
German inflation forecasts are more accurate than the growth predictions, contrary to 
the findings for the US and the UK. 
A comparison of the forecasts with naïve forecasts using Theil’s U coefficient indicates 
that all of the forecasts are very much superior to simple extrapolations of the  
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Table 1 
Annual forecasts of percentage changes of real GDP and of GDP price deflator for 
Germany: summary measures of error 
1967 to 2001 
 real GDP GDP price deflator 
 JD CEE OECD GAER JD CEE OECD GAER 
 1967 to 2001 
MAE 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 
RMSPE 128.6 126.6 138.7 108.3 92.4 87.6 78.1 78.7 
Bias 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 
U 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
UM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
UV 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 
UC 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 
RMSE/   0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
 1970 to 1979 
MAE 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 0.8 1.2 
RMSPE 173.5 140.9 198.4 67.9 25.4 24.0 19.9 22.8 
Bias 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 
U 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
UM 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 
UV 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
UC 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 
RMSE/   0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 
 1980 to 1989 
MAE 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 
RMSPE 87.3 85.3 88.9 93.1 25.6 22.2 33.1 22.1 
Bias -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
U 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
UM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
UV 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
UC 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 
RMSE/   0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 
 1990 to 2001 
MAE 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 
RMSPE 127.9 154.1 128.2 150.8 97.4 120.9 124.0 84.6 
Bias 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 
U 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
UM 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 
UV 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 
UC 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.6 
RMSE/   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Author’s computations. For sources, abbreviations and computation of the error measures see text. 
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Table 2 
Correlations1 of major institutions’ forecasts for Germany 
1967 to 2001 
  JD CEE OECD GAER 
JD 1967 to 2001 - 0,951 0,948 0,971 
 1970 to 1979 - 0,925 0,942 0,964 
 1980 to 1989 - 0,896 0,794 0,925 
 1990 to 2001 - 0,951 0,958 0,961 
CEE 1967 to 2001 0,903 - 0,945 0,961 
 1970 to 1979 0,919 - 0,925 0,963 
 1980 to 1989 0,795 - 0,918 0,954 
 1990 to 2001 0,943 - 0,915 0,921 
OECD 1967 to 2001 0,831 0,895 - 0,971 
 1970 to 1979 0,719 0,803 - 0,945 
 1980 to 1989 0,828 0,813 - 0,897 
 1990 to 2001 0,927 0,948 - 0,989 
GAER 1967 to 2001 0,874 0,885 0,824 - 
 1970 to 1979 0,736 0,802 0,546 - 
 1980 to 1989 0,828 0,813 0,885 - 
 1990 to 2001 0,873 0,925 0,869 - 
Authors’ computations. – 1) r between the real GDP forecasts (left of main diagonal) and forecasts of 
GDP price deflator (right of main diagonal). 
previousactual rates of change.11 Most of the errors are due to an incomplete capturing 
of the co-variance between forecasts and actual data (UC) which is considered as not 
disturbing.  
The average errors of all four groups were similar for both variables, with perhaps the 
JD growth predictions being an exception. Although the forecasts were highly correlated 
(Table 2), we tested whether there was a statistically significant difference in the 
accuracy of the four groups. The forecasts for each year were, therefore, ranked on the 
                                                 
11
 That is not all too surprising given the very long period with four major recessions. (It is hard to 
imagine that any mechanical use of any (naive) scheme will capture this).  
12 
 
basis of their accuracy and the average rankings test (also called analysis of variance by 
ranks) was used (Stekler, 1991). There was no significant difference among the four 
groups’ predictions either of growth or of inflation.12 
Based upon a classification13 developed in Heilemann (2002), the forecasts are found to 
be more accurate during periods of recovery and growth than in periods of recession, 
with the failure to predict the recessions resulting in turning point errors. All of the 
institutions failed to predict at least some of the four recessions that occurred in this 
period. This result are similar to those observed in the US and UK forecasts.  
The German forecasts also displayed some but not all of the systematic errors that had 
been observed in other predictions. Fildes and Stekler had noted that the US and UK 
forecasters underestimated GDP when it was growing and conversely when it was 
declining; similar errors were observed when inflation was accelerating and 
decelerating. On the other hand, the German forecasts contained an approximately equal 
number of underestimates and overestimates of the growth rate, but there was a 
tendency to underestimate the inflation rate when it was increasing and overestimating it 
when it was declining. The more refined analysis (IC) for the complete sample shows 
that the hypothesis of an independence of the accelerations and decelerations of the 
growth forecasts and actual values can be rejected at or close to the 5% level. (Table 3). 
In other words, the forecasters were able to determine whether the German economy 
would grow faster (slower) next year relative to this year. With the exception of the 
OECD forecasts, this was not the case for the inflation forecasts. 
Finally, although the results are not presented here, the regression rationality test did not  
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  This classification, also shown in the figures, is based on a multivariate four-phase-scheme to classify business 
cycles consisting of upswing periods (Lower turning point phases and Upswings) and downswing periods 
(Upper turning point phase and Downswing). 
  
Table 3 
Accuracy of forecasts of directional change of real GDP growth and of GDP price deflator for Germany 
1968 to 2001 
 JD CEE OECD GAER 
 IC 
(C) AC AW DC DW 
IC 
(C) AC AW DC DW 
IC 
(C) AC AW DC DW 
IC 
(C) AC AW DC DW 
 Real GDP 
1968 to 2001 1.35 8 4 15 7 1.71 12 2 17 3 1.41 9 4 15 6 1.43 12 7 12 3 
 (3.826)     (16.703)     (5.384)     (6.333)     
1970 to 1979 1.40 3 2 4 1 1.86 3 0 6 1 1.86 3 0 6 1 1.40 3 2 4 1 
           (6.429)     (1.667)     
1980 to 1989 0.90 1 2 4 3 1.58 3 1 5 1 1.17 2 2 4 2 1.17 2 2 4 2 
                     
1990 to 2001 1.78 3 0 7 2 1.66 4 1 6 1 1.31 3 2 5 2 1.63 5 3 4 0 
                     
 GDP price deflator 
1968 to 2001 1.30 8 4 14 8 1.33 7 3 15 9 1.52 6 1 16 8 1.30 8 4 14 8 
 (2.862)     (2.993)     (6.004)     (2.862)     
1970 to 1979 1.25 3 1 3 3 1.10 2 1 3 4 1.50 2 0 3 3 0.83 2 2 2 4 
                     
1980 to 1989 1.38 2 1 5 2 1.75 2 0 6 2 1.75 2 0 6 2 1.58 3 1 5 1 
                     
1990 to 2001 1.25 2 2 6 2 1.25 2 2 6 2 1.44 2 1 7 2 1.44 2 1 7 2 
                     
Authors’ computations, for computation see text and Appendix. – AC (AW): acceleration correctly (wrongly) forecast. DC (DW): deceleration correctly (wrongly) forecast. IC: information content, C : test on 
information content. 
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Table 4 
Annual forecasts of percentage changes of real GDP and of GDP price deflator for 
Germany: summary measures of directional errors 
1967 to 2001 
 real GDP GDP price deflator 
 JD CEE OECD GAER JD CEE OECD GAER 
 1967 to 2001 
Number of                 
Overestimates 4 (4) 3 (2) 1 (0) 3 (2) 3 (3) 5 (5) 4 (4) 4 (4) 
Underestimates 17 (12) 17 (15) 13 (10) 16 (11) 16 (14) 14 (11) 14 (11) 17 (14) 
Turning point errors 8 (8) 5 (5) 7 (7) 6 (6) 3 (3) 5 (5) 3 (3) 2 (2) 
Coincidences 0 (5) 4 (7) 8 (12) 4 (10) 6 (8) 4 (7) 5 (8) 5 (8) 
Other errors 5 (6) 5 (6) 5 (6) 5 (6) 6 (7) 6 (7) 6 (7) 6 (7) 
 1970 to 1979 
Number of                 
Overestimates 1 (1) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (2) 2 (2) 
Underestimates 7 (5) 6 (4) 4 (3) 7 (3) 4 (3) 4 (2) 4 (2) 5 (3) 
Turning point errors 2 (1) 1 (1) 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Coincidences 0 (2) 2 (4) 3 (5) 1 (5) 1 (1) 0 (1) 2 (3) 1 (2) 
Other errors 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 
 1980 to 1989 
Number of                 
Overestimates 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 
Underestimates 6 (3) 6 (4) 4 (2) 4 (2) 6 (4) 5 (4) 4 (3) 5 (4) 
Turning point errors 3 (3) 2 (2) 3 (3) 3 (3) 1 (1) 2 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 
Coincidences 0 (2) 1 (2) 2 (3) 2 (3) 3 (4) 2 (3) 1 (2) 2 (3) 
Other errors 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
 1990 to 2001 
Number of                 
Overestimates 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (0) 0 (1) 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Underestimates 5 (4) 8 (8) 7 (7) 8 (6) 7 (6) 3 (2) 6 (5) 7 (6) 
Turning point errors 4 (4) 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1) 3 (3) 1 (1) 0 (0) 
Coincidences 1 (2) 2 (2) 2 (3) 2 (3) 0 (2) 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 
Other errors 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 
Authors’ computations. For sources, abbreviations and computation of the measures of directional errors measures see text. In 
parentheses: coincidences: actual = ± 0.25 percent. 
reject the null that the forecasts were unbiased. However, for the entire period, the 
hypothesis of the efficiency of both the growth and inflation forecasts is rejected 
(Table 4). The β-test indicates that the forecast errors are positively related to the 
forecasts and the ρ-test reveals that most forecast errors are autocorrelated. The 
exceptions are the inflation forecasts of the OECD and the GAER.  
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4. Results: Accuracy over time  
We use four different approaches to determine whether forecast accuracy has improved 
over time. They involve (1) an examination of directional errors, (2) stability tests for 
forecast accuracy, (3) adjustments for the difficulty in forecasting in each time period, 
and (4) comparisons with benchmarks, including an econometric model. 
4.1. Directional errors 
The small number of observations in each sub-period precludes formal statistical tests, 
but descriptive results can be obtained from the information content statistics. If there 
had been an increase in accuracy over time, this statistic should be increasing 
monotonically from the 1970s to the 1990s. It can, however, be seen that the 
information content of the growth forecasts deteriorates in the 1980s but generally 
improves in the 1990s. A similar result can be observed in the inflation forecasts of the 
1990s (Table 3). The biases are lower in the 1980s and 1990s than they were in the 
1970s, but there is also no clear downward trend.14 These results suggest that there is no 
tendency towards a monotonic improvement in accuracy.  
4.2. Quantitative Errors 
The time trend of the quantitative forecast errors for both variables also yields mixed 
results (Table 1). There were very large errors in the late 1960s. The MAEs in the 1970s 
ranged from 1.3 to 1.9 percentage points for growth and from 0.8 to 1.3 for inflation. 
These errors reflect the wage explosion in the early 1970s and the oil shock and its 
aftermath. The errors decline in the 1980s and 1990s to about 1.0 percentage point for 
growth and to 0.5 for inflation. While the MAEs show a decline from the 1970s through 
the 1990s, the RMSPEs rise between the 1980s and 1990s. These results require a 
further interpretation. We examine this issue by conducting a stability test and also by 
adjusting the errors for the difficulties involved in forecasting each period. 
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4.2.1. Stability Test 
The stability tests of the forecast accuracy are analogous to the CUSUM tests of 
regression analysis15:  
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tσ : standard deviation of actual values t1 x,...,x . 
The CUSUM test here is based on a plot of the recursive errors. We restrict ourselves to 
the CUSUM-of-squares which plots the cumulative sum of squared residuals, expressed 
as a fraction of these squared residuals summed over all observations. If this sum goes 
outside a critical bound, this indicates that there was a structural break of the 
relationship of the average forecast accuracy (Brown et al., 1976). 
The CUSUM of squares test is plotted in Figure 2. It shows that the forecasts of both 
variables made by the German forecasters display structural shifts from the early 1970s 
to the mid 1980s.16 The performance of all the German forecasters is quite similar 
suggesting that there was forecasting improvement after the 1970s, but not 
subsequently. 
                                                                                                                                               
14
 The bias of the growth forecasts is rather high in the 1970s and again in the 1990s, while the magnitude became 
negligible during the 1980s. 
15
  It should be remembered that CUSUM tests had long been used in quality control before they were transformed 
to be applied for stability analysis in regression analysis (see e.g. Brown et al., 1976).  
16
  It must be remembered that the results are very sensitive to the starting period and limited to forward recursive 
computations. 
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Figure 2 
CUSUM of squares tests of growth and inflation forecasts
1968 to 2001
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4.2.2. Adjusting for the difficulties of forecasting 
The approach of the previous section, did not adjust for the difficulties involved in 
forecasting. One possible adjustment is to divide the RMSE by the standard deviation of 
the actual changes that occurred in each time period. The last entry in each panel of 
Table 1 presents this measure. This measure indicates that the forecast errors, adjusted 
for this variability, for both variables were similar in the 1980s and 1990s and slightly 
smaller than those of the 1970s. The stability tests using recursive RMSPEs (lower 
panels of Figures 2 and 3) yield similar results, with a slight increase in 2001 due to the 
recession. All in all, there is some evidence of improvement in absolute forecasting 
accuracy, in particular if the oil and wage shocks in the 1970s are taken into account, 
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but relative stability (based on the variance and rates of change) has been rather 
constant.  
4.2.3. Explaining the results 
The data reveal some of the factors that reduce accuracy and suggest areas where a 
forecaster should place his efforts in order to approach this limit. The effects of the 
errors made in predicting the recessions and downswings of 1974, 1980/81, and 2001 
can be identified even in the recursive accuracy of growth forecasts.17 While this 
finding suggests that greater efforts should be placed on predicting recessions in 
advance, it must be remembered that forecasters in other countries also have failed to 
predict the onset of recessions. 
Similarly the impact that wage inflation and the oil-shocks had on inflation in the first 
half of the 1970s can be observed, but the statistics decline steadily towards a limit 
afterwards. The most plausible explanation is that exogenous inflation impulses and 
internal inflation behavior simply had normalized (see Figure 1) and forecasters have 
been able to forecast accurately in this environment.  
However, a very important finding is that the recursive statistics show a declining trend 
that seems to be approaching a limit, i.e. a level beyond which accuracy cannot be 
improved, at least not with the current state of theory, forecasting methods, available 
data. While Fildes & Stekler (2002) did not discuss the limits of accuracy, their results 
are not in conflict with this view. We turn our attention to this issue in the next section. 
4.3. Bench mark comparisons 
In judging the quality of these forecasts, only the Theil U statistic has been used as a 
benchmark. This naïve model is rather simple because it mechanically extrapolates last 
period’s observed change. A more appropriate comparison would be with the 
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performance of macroeconometric models. While ex ante forecasts with these models 
show the usual inaccuracies of macroeconomic forecasts, their ex post performance is 
usually much better and may be used as a yardstick. 
For this purpose we use the RWI-business cycle model, a medium sized (quarterly) 
macroeconometric model employed since the late 1970s for short term ex ante 
forecasting and simulations (see Heilemann, 2002, for details of the model). In our 
analysis this model was used to produce ex post static forecasts for each of the years 
1980 to 1989. Each forecast was based on the actual values of all predetermined 
variables (exogenous variables and lagged endogenous variables). As an example, the 
data referring to the first half year of 1979 were used to forecast the second half of that 
year and all of 1980. This process was repeated to make forecasts for the other years. 
Hence the errors of these consecutive static simulations within the sample period are 
free from the errors that in ex ante forecasts are caused by (1) wrong assumptions about 
the predetermined variables, (2) the inability to capture the dynamics of multiperiod 
forecasts, and (3) the instability of the model outside the sample period. 18 The year 
ahead forecast was then based on consecutive simulated values for the current year’s 
third and fourth quarters and for the complete next year. This procedure simulates the 
forecasting procedures that were actually but more importantly it generates the highest 
forecast accuracy possible with a structural econometric model.  
The model’s ex post growth MAE19 was 0.6 percentage points, and the comparable 
RMSPE was 53.9 %. For inflation the respective errors were 0.4 percentage points and 
17.9 %. The model’s inflation errors for the period 1980-89 are very similar to those of 
the four forecasting groups. This suggests that the inflation forecasts for this period had 
                                                                                                                                               
17
 Surprisingly, the effects of German unification and the 1993 recession cannot be detected in this 
statistic. 
18
  The errors of static simulations can be further decomposed into stochastic equation errors and “model 
errors”, that originate from the model’s interaction within each solution period. It can be shown for 
the RWI-model (and probably for most models of this type), that for highly aggregated variables like 
GDP growth and the GDP deflator, the latter tends to be negligible. The main cause for this are the 
considerable aggregation gains, which, of course, do not show up on the single equation level. 
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achieved the highest accuracy level that was attainable. On the other hand, the model 
was substantially more accurate than the four organizations in predicting the rate of 
growth of the economy. It made no turning point errors, and the size of its errors was 
about 60% of those made by the four organizations. Since the model’s errors represent 
the maximum accuracy attainable given the current state of macroeconomic forecasting, 
we provide the following interpretation. The quality of the growth forecasts can still be 
improved, but the expected increase in the accuracy of the ex ante predictions may not 
be that substantial.20 
5. Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
At the outset we posed a question: Has the accuracy of German macroeconomic 
forecasts improved over the last 40 years? The answer is that it depends, but certainly 
there is no clear cut trend towards improving accuracy. In terms of the absolute size of 
errors, the accuracy of both the growth and inflation forecasts have improved since the 
1970s. The improvements, however, seem to be mainly due to the decline of the actual 
rates of change of growth and inflation and to the variability of these growth rates. The 
improvement is not so obvious if we are concerned with directional accuracy. The 
recessions in 1975, 1981/82 and 1993 were seen only after the fact, while the booms in 
the late 1960s and in the early 1990s were missed. These directional errors contributed 
substantially to the observed MAEs of the growth forecasts. 
We believe that there is some room for improvement in these because the errors of these 
forecasts exceed the errors of the ex post forecasts obtained from the econometric 
model. The MAEs of the model’s forecast were 0.6 percentage points for growth and of 
0.4 for inflation. In general future forecast evaluations should determine the sources of 
forecast errors. Are they the result of faulty assumptions, misleading theories, empirical 
irregularities, insufficient data, etc.? Certainly, the errors cannot be blamed on the lack 
                                                                                                                                               
19
  Given that the model has been estimated by OLS, RMSE would have been a more adequate error 
measure but this would have caused problems of comparability with present results.  
20
  This is especially true since preliminary research indicates that some of the equations in the RWI 
model had larger errors in the 1986-2001 period than had been observed previously. 
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of resources because in the last few decades there has been substantial research activity 
on macroeconomic theory and forecasting methods in Germany and elsewhere that 
German forecasters could exploit. However, the quality of the German macro data may 
be a limiting factor in the ability to produce more accurate real time forecasts.21 
We naturally recommend that theory, methods, and data be improved. While such 
efforts should be made, a more productive strategy in the short run may be to investigate 
why forecast accuracy differs over time, why forecasts for some countries are more 
accurate than for others (see e.g. Kreinin, 2002), whether some methods or forecasters 
are more “robust” than others, etc. In short: what determines forecast accuracy? Most 
forecast evaluations analyze “average” forecast accuracy, but we believe that it is 
equally necessary to undertake case studies to determine why the forecast errors 
occurred (see, for example, Fintzen & Stekler, 1999; Wallis (Ed.), 1987). We 
recommend as a first step that forecasters present an analysis of the accuracy of their 
last prediction at the same time that they are presenting their new forecast. Such an 
analysis should include a discussion of the role that assumptions, policy actions, random 
shocks, behavioral changes and interdependencies (offsetting errors) played in causing 
the observed errors. On the other hand, it may be that the one-percent-MAE for six-
quarters-ahead GDP forecasts is a natural constant as this and other studies seem to 
suggest. If that is the limit to forecast accuracy, we will have to learn to accept it.  
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  The difference between the first and the final release of German real GDP data amounts to 1 
percentage point (Heilemann, 2002).  
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Appendix 
Table 5 
Forecasts and actual data 
1967 to 2001 
 real GDP GDP-Deflator 
 JD CEE OECD GAER actual JD CEE OECD1 GAER actual 
1967 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.0 0.0 2.5 2.0 - 2.0 0.5 
1968 5.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 7.5 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 
1969 3.5 4.5 5.0 4.5 8.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 3.5 
1970 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 4.5 5.0 4.5 5.0 7.5 
1971 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 - 4.5 7.5 
1972 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 
1973 5.0 5.5 5.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.5 5.5 6.0 
1974 3.0 2.5 3.5 1.0 0.5 7.0 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 
1975 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 -3.5 7.0 6.0 6.5 6.5 8.0 
1976 4.0 4.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 
1977 5.5 4.5 3.5 5.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 
1978 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 
1979 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 
1980 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.0 5.0 
1981 0.0 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 
1982 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.5 -1.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 5.0 
1983 0.0 1.0 -0.5 0.0 1.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 
1984 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 
1985 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 
1986 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 
1987 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 
1988 2.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 3.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.5 
1989 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 5.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 
1990 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.5 
1991 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 
1992 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.5 
1993 0.5 0.0 1.0 -0.5 -2.0 4.0 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.0 
1994 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 
1995 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
1996 2.5 2.0 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.0 
1997 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 
1998 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1999 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 
2000 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 -0.5 
2001 2.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 
Sources: Arbeitsgemeinschaft 1966ff., Sachverständigenrat 1966/67ff., OECD 1966ff., Bundesregierung 
1967ff., rounded. 
